

July

Henson:

Dulles wanted G) to fill "vacuum" in ME left
by weakening relations of Britain and France
(b) to have a "free hand" from Britain

like VN

("weak power" - better to get out, and let Dulles
continue in our way).

(Dehson had started).

[What if US had "helped" in Malaya?]

- [US role in UK-Egypt treaty of 1954?]

UK excluded from MEDO.

Baghdad Post

G. Lyp: signs of US replacing UK-France alerted SU
to need to move in fast, rather than await chance.

Against UK, - French,
Israel,

Until summer of '56, Dulles hoped to work with
Nasser, not manipulate him, as only visible leader.

(Nasser's threats laughable) (Thought Nasser's needs too
great.) (^{support for} Aswan Dam was ¹⁹⁵³ his idea).

Dec '55 indicated possibility to Nasser; he refused
to discuss, for 6 months, while US urged.

On 19 July 1956 Nasser suddenly ~~announced~~ decided would
ask for aid (Nasser, had been flirty with

the felt use of force not appropriate:

"If you do occupy Canal and topple Nasser, what then?
Who do you have, to replace? Will you occupy indefinitely?
Will Arabs accept colonialism?" Eden never replied.

Eden: Nasser = Hitler Egypt-SU ans: = Nazi-Soviet Pact
dominos — ME would collapse, Nasser was as bad
(France: North Africa).
"aggressor"

Pinson to Dillon: Dulles was responsible for crisis, by turning down
Aswan — even though that was good.

Mollat claimed SU offered peace in Algeria on French terms
if France would be less friendly to US in Europe; France
refused, so US owed it something. ("Some blackmail of US
as in 1954 over Indochina"? NO: France/any have agreed with
SU: didn't threaten US!)
Rather: some ^{or, offer} blackmail of France by
Sovs.

Acheson believed we should support European allies anywhere,
even in colonial ventures. (?) Dulles thought not.

[Nasser intent, on July

— Dulles would not believe that in early word
of Egypt - saw arms pact; when he learned,
in Sept? 1955, he was ^{amazed +} outraged; violated
"Spirit of Geneva."

Merson: (He asked Bulganin, ^{before conference} How can you be doing this?)

Dulles believed Soviets wanted to change Tripartite Agreement
to Four-power Agreement.

Dulles didn't want to "legitimize" SU - help
Parties in Italy + France...

Dulles believed big mistake had been made in
allowing France to remain

NO JUNIOR FELLOW LUNCH
Tues., Nov. 11 - holiday

SOCIETY OF FELLOWS
1958-1959

Senior Fellows

Nathan M. PUSEY, President of the University, ex officio
McGeorge BUNDY, Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, ex officio
Crane BRINTON, McLean Professor of Ancient and Modern History, Chairman
Frederick L. HISAW, Fisher Professor of Natural History
Wassily W. LEONTIEF, Henry Lee Professor of Economics
Harry T. LEVIN, Professor of English and Comparative Literature
Arthur D. NOCK, Frothingham Professor of the History of Religion
Renato POGGIOLI, Professor of Slavic and Comparative Literature
Edward M. PURCELL, Professor of Physics
Willard V. QUINE, Edgar Pierce Professor of Philosophy (absent 1958-59)

Junior Fellows

(addresses in Cambridge unless otherwise indicated)

Term expires 1959

- *Daniel ELLSBERG, 1053 Concord Ave., Belmont (Economic Theory) IV 4-7763
- Donald P. HANSEN, Kirkland M-32 (Fine Arts) TR 6-8247
- *K. Jaakko J. HINTIKKA, 1 Craigie St. (Mathematical Logic) UN 4-2144
- *Calvert W. WATKINS, 12 Fayette St. (Indo-European Linguistics) UN 4-5517
- Tai Tsun WU, Inst. of Advanced Study, Princeton, N.J. (Applied Physics)

Term expires 1960

- Seth G. BENARDETE, Eliot G-33 (Classics) UN 4-0725
- *Tilman F. E. BUDDENSIEG, abroad until February (Art History)
- *Herbert A. DAVIDSON, 82 Am. Legion Hwy., Dorchester (Hebrew Philosophic Literature) TA 5-4407
- *Franklin M. FISHER, 15 Ellery St. (Economics) UN 4-7874
- Dudley R. HERSCHBACH, Leverett G-32 (Chemical Physics)
- *Everett I. MENDELSON, 58 Washington Ave. (History of Science) UN 4-5753
- *Duane G. METZGER, in Mexico until January (Social Anthropology)
- Robert E. NEIL, Dunster J-32 (Modern European History) UN 4-2491
- *Robert G. REEVES, 23-C Shaler Lane (Physiology) UN 4-4336

Term expires 1961

- *Timothy H. GOLDSMITH, 30 Bartlett Ave., Belmont (Biology) IV 9-0472
- Louis KAMPF, Dunster H-21 (English and Comparative Literature) EL 4-5565
- *David B. LEWIN, 209 Beacon St., Boston (Music) KE 6-9810
- David B. MUMFORD, Claverly 44 (Mathematics) KI 7-5054
- *Richard M. OHMANN, 1306 Massachusetts Ave. (English) UN 4-4991
- Charles D. PARSONS, Eliot E-32 (Philosophy, Mathematical Logic) EL 4-7701

*Married

OVER

Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Cuba

The tides of peace were at their crest when a new President took office in 1961; yet within two years a series of mistakes had brought Washington and Moscow to the edge of nuclear war. A distinguished columnist reveals these errors and specifies some lessons for the Nixon Administration.

By DREW PEARSON

IFELT," said the late Senator Robert F. Kennedy, "that we were on the edge of a precipice with no way off." He was describing the "Thirteen Days" in October 1962 during which the United States almost went to war with Soviet Russia over the Cuban missile crisis. Kennedy's book is being cited by various experts as a lesson for President Nixon, and it is. David Schoenbrun, who covered the crisis for CBS, warns that Mr. Nixon should be aware of hawkish advisers. John Kenneth Galbraith, who was then Ambassador to India, points out that President Kennedy's political neck—and for that matter the United States—was saved by men of moral courage. Dean Acheson, who participated in the talks, is convinced President Kennedy was "phenomenally lucky."

While all of the above are true, I would like to make the very important point that the Cuban missile crisis didn't have to happen. And that is the chief lesson for President Nixon. It was not necessary for Kennedy to depend on the advice of either hawkish generals or men of moral courage. For it was not necessary to bring the two most powerful nuclear nations to the brink of war, and it was not necessary to risk a challenge to Soviet vessels on the high seas. For the express duty and function of diplomacy are to prevent these crises. When they happen it is because diplomacy has been neglectful, irresponsible, inefficient.

Some of the events in the early days of the Kennedy Administration which led to the Cuban missile crisis were so

juvenile, so overconfident, that they amounted to a travesty of diplomacy. A case in point is the inexcusable failure of Secretary of State Dean Rusk to carry out the President's orders to remove American missiles from Turkey—one of Khrushchev's main reasons for placing Russian missiles in Cuba. Twice the President gave orders to remove American missiles from a country that is not 90 miles distant, as Cuba is from the United States, but only 100 yards from the Soviet Union. Yet these orders were never carried out.

THIS error is passed over very lightly in Senator Kennedy's book. But it was one of the many mistakes of American diplomacy which led to the most serious danger of major war the United States has faced since December 7, 1941.

There were other serious mistakes, and they began on the day John F. Kennedy took the oath of office, January 20, 1961. They were related to me by such men as the late Adlai Stevenson, former Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles, Senator William Fulbright of Arkansas, and Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, both members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I relate them here in the hope that President Nixon, who faces the same opportunities as John F. Kennedy, may not repeat his mistakes.

Perhaps the most intriguing of these conversations took place high in the Montenegrin mountains in August 1962, two months before the Cuban missile crisis. Adlai Stevenson and I were the guests of Mrs. Eugene Meyer on a yachting cruise along the Adriatic coast and

had traveled with Chief Justice Earl Warren into the interior of Montenegro, partly to give "the chief" some fishing. Our Montenegrin hosts had taken us to a secluded mountain lake where Warren set out in a rowboat to test its potentialities. Stevenson and I, meanwhile, walked among the pine trees along the shore. Perhaps it was the isolation of the spot, but he began talking of his trials and tribulations as Ambassador to the United Nations. The State Department in Washington gave him little authority. He was a diplomatic puppet, dancing to the tune of the career men in Washington. Dean Rusk was slow, sometimes to the point of exasperation.

Stevenson's chief hope had been that he could contribute something toward peace by improving relations with Soviet Russia. To that end he urged Kennedy, in December 1960, shortly after he was elected and before his Inauguration, to take the initiative with the Soviet government. Khrushchev, he said, was ripe for friendly overtures. Averell Harriman had reported, even before the election, that Khrushchev was throwing whatever indirect influence the Soviets had against Nixon. Specifically, he had refused to release the RB-47 Naval fliers before the election for fear it would help Nixon.

AFTER Kennedy's victory, Khrushchev suggested through Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin in Washington that the Soviets might send a special ambassador of Cabinet rank to the Inauguration. Kennedy turned this down. On Inauguration day, Khrushchev sent an effusive telegram, overflowing with friendship, to the new President. Ken-

the Berlin Wall, and there followed a hue and cry from American right-wingers that we move in and tear it down.

On August 17, while the wall was still being perfected, I was conducting the aforementioned interview with Khrushchev on the shores of the Black Sea. The formal interview extended into a series of talks lasting two days, during which time we swam, breakfasted, and dined together. Khrushchev started off on a serious, formal note, but later relaxed and came forth with amazingly frank statements about his concern for the peace of the world and his problems with American leaders. It was at this time that he told of his hopes that Kennedy might be elected President over Richard Nixon.

"In October 1960," he said, "the American Ambassador came to see me and wanted to release the American RB-47 flyers as a gesture to show that our two countries could work together. 'No,' I replied, 'this would only help Nixon, and we're voting for Kennedy.' And inasmuch as Kennedy was elected by a very narrow margin, I figure that we elected him."

AS Mrs. Pearson and I were saying good-bye to Khrushchev two days later, he said: "Please tell Mr. Kennedy that if the United States and Russia stand together, no country in the world can start war."

I delivered this message to Kennedy four days later under very unfavorable circumstances. Twenty minutes before I saw the President in the upstairs living room of the White House, he had received word from the Atomic Energy Commission that the Soviet government had resumed nuclear testing. Khrushchev had hinted to me that this might take place, though I did not take him seriously. He was under great pressure from the generals in the Red Army, he said, to resume testing because of their belief that American nuclear production was far ahead of that of the Soviet Union. He was also under pressure, he said, because Kennedy had called up the Reserves, to continue the class of the Red Army about to be mustered for another tour of duty. President Kennedy was so upset over the news that the Soviet Union had resumed nuclear testing that I am quite sure my report on the interview with Khrushchev made scant impression.

My talk with Kennedy took place in the last days of August 1961, and the next month he sent Rostow and Gen. Maxwell Taylor to Saigon to make recommendations on what policy the Kennedy Administration should follow in South Vietnam. John Kenneth Galbraith heard about their trip from his post in India and flew back to Washington to try to influence its final result, or at least



negate it with Kennedy. He knew that Rostow, the hawk, was likely to recommend military intervention. That was exactly what he did. And it was at this crucial point that President Kennedy made the first major military commitment in South Vietnam. Hitherto, the level of troops had been kept to 1,000 so-called military advisers, sent by former President Eisenhower. But in September 1961, Kennedy sent 18,000 men and later upped this to 30,000.

George Ball, then Under Secretary of State, who opposed the escalation, is convinced that the President made it because he had suffered a series of defeats—first at the Bay of Pigs, later in Vienna, later with the Berlin Wall. By sending troops to Saigon, he was determined to recoup his prestige and that of the United States. Thus mistake built upon mistake; the early rebuff to Khrushchev, the Bay of Pigs, the failure to remove American missiles from Turkey, Khrushchev's nuclear rebuff to the United States—all pointed toward the showdown over Cuba when the United States and Soviet Russia stood eyeball-to-eyeball on the brink of war.

I do not mean to say that mistakes were not also made by the Kremlin. I am sure they were. But I was not privy to conversations inside the Kremlin, as I was to conversations with American leaders. I can only report factually on American mistakes. There were enough of these to have precipitated the Cuban missile crisis by themselves, without those made by the Soviets. Undoubtedly Khrushchev's biggest mistake was to misjudge the United States by sending the missiles to Cuba in the first place.

The lesson to be learned from these mistakes is herewith spread out for Mr. Nixon. The tides of peace are like the tides of man. They must be ridden on the crest, not on the ebb. On the very day that Mr. Nixon was delivering his inspiring Inaugural speech pledging his all-out effort for peace in the world, the Soviet government was officially offering to begin talks with the United States on limiting offensive and defensive missiles just as soon as Mr. Nixon was ready. As I read the announcement, I couldn't help thinking that this is where I came in with another President's Inauguration on January 20, 1961.

UFOs AND THE EVIDENCE

"We are in no position to assert what is or is not possible for some extraterrestrial technology . . ."

By FREDERICK J. HOOVEN

THE subject of UFOs is a vast one. At least 20,000 reports are on record of sightings of some kind of flying object not identified, and it has been estimated that from five to ten times as many observations have not been recorded. The reports come from all periods of history (the Old Testament book of Ezekiel is a typical flying saucer, or UFO, report) and from all parts of the world, the highest concentrations corresponding with the times and places of most effective communication.

Roughly 95 per cent of these reports can be readily attributed to misinterpretations of such common objects as planets, stars, satellites, meteorites, weather balloons, and aircraft. It is astonishing how many people have never studied the sky, and when their attention is called to it they become greatly excited by a sighting of Venus, Jupiter, Mars, or the star Sirius. An additional fraction of the reports turn out to be hoaxes, pranks, or psychopathic phenomena.

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This leaves a residue of reports that have resisted any of these explanations, and that have originated with solidly credible witnesses, some of them professionally skilled. Of this residue a small proportion share common aspects that are difficult to attribute to anything but some kind of objective reality.

About 1950, it was suggested that UFOs were vehicles from another world that were observing Earth. There was something about this suggestion that tickled the fancy of almost everybody, even those who felt certain it was not true. Since that time people have taken positions on the subject, their beliefs varying along a spectrum, or scale of 100, with the absolute unbelievers at the zero end, the utterly faithful enthusiasts at the 100 end, and the majority somewhere between. Most scientists are clustered around the zero mark.

In October 1966, the U.S. Air Force commissioned the University of Colorado to conduct a thorough study of the UFO question. The study was conducted by a group directed by Dr. Edward U. Condon, a scientist and public figure of the first rank, and its official report, *Scientific Study of Unidentified Flying Objects*, was issued last January.

I served as a consultant to the Colorado group along with David F. Moyer; we were both working for the Ford Company. There had been a great number of reports that included accounts of automobiles malfunctioning in some way in the presence of UFOs, and, when the project was initiated, Dr. Condon requested assistance from the automobile industry in evaluating these reports. With the assistance of Ford engineers and scientists, a painstaking analysis was conducted of a car that had figured in a UFO report. In the process, techniques were developed and described for analyzing automobiles for possible after-effects of radioactive and magnetic phenomena, neither of which was found in the car examined.


The report begins with an introduction by Walter Sullivan, science editor of *The New York Times*, and a fairly complete picture can be obtained by reading it along with the report's conclusions and recommendations, and a summary, written by Condon. The body of the report is voluminous, with detailed analyses of fifty-nine case studies, buttressed by extensive discussions of the physical and perceptual phenomena involved. Special attention is given to radar anomalies, visual illusions, and some of the aspects of common objects likely to be mistaken for UFOs. There is historical background, and extensive documentation. The quality of the writing and the editing is outstanding.

THE report concludes that inasmuch as there is no positive evidence of extraordinary phenomena, it can safely be assumed that UFOs are not anything extraordinary, and that the subject does not warrant further scientific study. The logic of this particular approach is defended in the following passage, quoted from the report's summary:

As a practical matter, we take the position that if an UFO report can be plausibly explained in ordinary terms, then we accept that explanation even though not enough evidence may be available to prove it beyond all doubt. This point is so important that perhaps an analogy is needed to make it clear. Several centuries ago, the most generally accepted theory of human disease was that it was caused by the patient's being possessed or inhabited by a devil or evil spirit. Different diseases were supposed to be caused by different devils. The guiding principle for medical research was then the study and classification of different kinds of devils, and progress in therapy was sought in the search for and discovery of means for exorcising each kind of devil.

Gradually medical research discovered bacteria, toxins and viruses, and their causative relation to various diseases. More and more diseases came to be described by their causes.

Suppose now that instead, medi-



"Howard, play me or trade me."

steeped in the Dulles policy of bowing daily before Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. But Kennedy did not move. And in April of that fateful year, there began a series of events that some diplomats said turned the luck of the Irish. In any event, they led to the Cuban missile crisis and the brink of war between Russia and the United States.

AFTER the United States invaded Cuba on April 18 in a poorly conceived, poorly prepared expedition masterminded by the CIA, Kennedy emerged as something of a hero to many Americans. His announcement that he was to blame aroused a sense of sympathy, even among those inclined to criticize. But it did not make him a hero abroad, especially in the Soviet Union.

Moreover, it did not make Mr. Kennedy a hero to himself. It gave him a definite inferiority complex. Here was a handsome young President, elected on the promise of giving the United States a new image in foreign affairs, yet he knew in his heart that he had failed. Prestige counts heavily with every human being, especially with men who represent nations; so the President of the United States sought to recoup his prestige and that of the United States. He invited Khrushchev to the meeting that only two months earlier he had vetoed.

Against this background, the Vienna

Conference took place in May 1961, a moment when Kennedy was suffering from the Bay of Pigs fiasco and when Khrushchev was growling both privately and publicly over having had his earlier overtures of friendship rebuffed. "I told young Mr. Kennedy that if he wants war, he can have war," Khrushchev later told me that summer during a very frank interview on the shores of the Black Sea.

"Mr. Kennedy told me," Khrushchev reported, "Our forces are now equal. We can destroy each other."

"Yes, Mr. President," I replied, "I agree, though in my heart I feel we are stronger. But I agree on the policy of equality. We regard the strength of the United States in a very serious light."

"We have to judge governments by their actions," I told him, "and the United States has now increased its defense budget, you have ordered the mobilization of more men, and you have ordered more bombers. These are not toys. The United States has now dispatched 1,500 additional troops to Berlin. This is a clear threat."

"I told Mr. Kennedy," Khrushchev continued, "that if he sent 50,000 troops to Berlin, it would offer us an opportunity to send even more troops; since we had more troops than he in closer to Berlin. 'If you introduce more troops to Berlin,' I told him, 'it will be a very unwise step.'"

Kennedy's Vienna Conference with Khrushchev got nowhere, and he returned to Washington a very shaken man. On the plane flying across the Atlantic, Kennedy advisers reported that he seemed more depressed than at any time in his life. He talked about the probability that his children might live under war. The first thing he did on arriving home was to get a military appraisal of the number of lives which would be lost in an atomic war.

I dined with President Kennedy three days after he had returned from Vienna. He was still in a very depressed mood. He said he did not see how the United States could get through the summer without war. Khrushchev, he said, was under obligation to the East Germans to sign a separate peace treaty. This, he said, would bring war. The next morning the President suffered a recurrence of his back injury and was confined to his bed for the next few weeks. Officially it resulted from planting a tree at a dedication. Some doctors, however, said it was psychosomatic; the result of his talk with Khrushchev.

TOWARD the end of the month, I was invited on a cruise down the Potomac by then Vice President Lyndon Johnson, in honor of the Premier of South Vietnam. On the yacht was Walt Rostow, Kennedy's national security adviser, who had been with him in Vienna. Rostow was glowing with pride over the results in Vienna. "Our President looked straight down the gun barrel of atomic war," Rostow said, "and he did not flinch."

I am sure this was true. But I am also sure that there was no necessity whatsoever for this confrontation. Had John F. Kennedy taken the advice of Adlai Stevenson, Chester Bowles, Senator Cooper, and others to meet Khrushchev halfway during the early months of 1961, he would never have had to look down that gun barrel.

By this time, however, Khrushchev had the bit in his teeth. He had been embarrassed by Kennedy's refusal to see him in New York in March. The Chinese and the big missile men in the Kremlin were taunting him over the increased military budget of the United States. At Vienna, Khrushchev, the son of a peasant and a shrewd trader, knew he had the upper hand with Kennedy. But back in Moscow, his hand was being called. He had argued that war with capitalism was not inevitable, that coexistence was the only substitute for atomic war and the end of civilization. But his gestures toward the United States had not been reciprocated.

I wrote at the time that Khrushchev and Kennedy were acting like "little boys with Halloween masks frightening each other into war."

A few weeks later, Khrushchev built



"I wish you'd at least have the common courtesy to keep quiet while we're discussing something."

nedy replied with a curt three-line message.

After the Inauguration, following a conference with the new President, Stevenson was asked by newsmen whether Kennedy would confer with Khrushchev if the Soviet leader came to New York for a special U.N. Assembly meeting. Stevenson had answered in the affirmative. Whereupon the White House issued a blunt denial. Later, Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson in Moscow was ordered to track down Chairman Khrushchev in Siberia where he was traveling and inform him that the new President of the United States preferred to postpone any early meeting. Khrushchev is reported to have hit the ceiling.

The American Embassy in Moscow reported early in 1961 that Khrushchev had been given six months in which to demonstrate to the Red Chinese that his policy of coexistence with the West would work. At the Communist Conference in Moscow in November 1960, the Chinese had vehemently opposed Khrushchev's so-called policy of appeasing the West. In a four-hour speech, the Chinese delegate had excoriated Khrushchev. This was followed by a Russo-Chinese compromise, which, according to the American Embassy, consisted of a six-month grace period during which Khrushchev would have to prove to the Red Chinese that his policy would work.

For this reason then, Kennedy's rebuff of Khrushchev's suggestion that they meet together in New York made the Soviet leader see red. Almost immediately, he turned off his policy of cooperation and began to haze Mr. Kennedy. The Kremlin delivered a brutal note regarding the Congo, undercutting the United Nations and everything the United States stood for there. Simultaneously the Soviet delegation of the Geneva nuclear testing conference stiffened its position. And there was stepped-up Communist activity in Laos.

Simultaneously, Kennedy made a saber-rattling speech threatening military intervention in Laos, appropriated more money for missiles, upped expenditures for B-52s, the long-range bombers. All Stevenson had advised was thrown overboard.

To cap it all, four months after Kennedy had taken office, Stevenson had stood up in the United Nations to defend—and lie about—the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, only to discover that Washington had not told him the truth. Yes, Adlai Stevenson was indeed discouraged.

It began to get cold high up in those Montenegrin mountains. The Chief Justice had exhausted his patience and rowed back to shore. He had caught two bluegills, too small to keep. Stevenson had finished his discourse, a confession of failure delivered two months before

eign Minister Gromyko, Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan, and others. He came back to dine with Kennedy and tell him this was the time for the United States to take the initiative regarding Berlin; otherwise the Russians would. They were in a friendly frame of mind toward the new Administration, but would not wait. European opinion, Cooper told Kennedy, generally agreed that sixteen years was long enough to delay signing a peace treaty with Germany.

Chester Bowles, who served as Under Secretary until he ran afoul of Robert



Drew Pearson, at left, with Mr. Khrushchev—"If the United States and Russia stand together, no country in the world can start war."

the Cuban missile crisis, a confession in which he saw Russian-American relations drifting from days of hope to days of danger.

I cannot remember the chronological order in which I talked to the others who had urged John F. Kennedy to take the initiative with Khrushchev early in his Administration for fresh new starts toward peace. Senator Cooper, a moderate Republican who had served with success as American Ambassador to India, had visited Moscow shortly before Kennedy's Inauguration and conferred with For-

Kennedy over the Bay of Pigs, advised likewise. So did Senator Fulbright, who had been on excellent relations with Kennedy until he heard Kennedy was about to undertake the Bay of Pigs invasion and passionately urged him, in his slow Arkansas drawl, not to do it. All told the new President, in those formative months in the winter of 1961, that he should take advantage of the Moscow thaw.

Perhaps it was Kennedy's caution. Perhaps it was the advice of old-line bureaucrats in the State Department,